kaal:claim:3962614-018

Information asymmetries increase in traditional VC investment rounds because startups are incentivized to self censor when engaging with VCs, having little data to work with and being reluctant to overexpose themselves to prospective investors.

Source quote, verbatim

Information asymmetries increase in traditional VC investment rounds as startups are incentivized to self-censor when engaging with VCs, as they have little data to work with, and are reluctant to overexpose themselves to prospective investors.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021), III. Alternative Early Round Funding Mechanisms, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, REPUTATION AS CAPITAL – How Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Address Shortcomings in the Ventu (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3962614

Holds when

early round engagement between startups and VCs

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: Startup self censorshipfamily: information-asymmetrydisclosureinnovation

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