kaal:claim:617681-006

Rule switching costs for a jurisdiction are probably higher when it must make substantial new demands on its courts in addition to changing its statutes, which raises the cost of competing with a bundled corporate law product.

Source quote, verbatim

Most important to the analysis in this paper, these rule switching costs are probably higher if the jurisdiction has to make substantial new demands on its courts as well as make changes to its statutes.

From

Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004), B.II Mobility Costs, Path Dependencies and Rule Switching Costs, p. 15
https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 · source PDF

Cite as

Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

Holds when

jurisdictions considering changing corporate law rules to attract charters

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedeconomics

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