kaal:claim:617681-008

Regulatory competition for a bundled product of statutes plus courts is only a realistic possibility if relatively high supply side hurdles can be overcome to induce states to enter the market for corporate law.

Source quote, verbatim

In sum, regulatory competition for a bundled product is only a realistic possibility if relatively high supply side hurdles can be overcome to induce states to enter the market for corporate law.

From

Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004), B.III Type A, Type B And Unbundled Type B Regulatory Competition, p. 18
https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681 · source PDF

Cite as

Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681

Holds when

markets for a bundled corporate law product

Classification

conditionsupport: arguedtokenomicsrisk-and-incentiveseconomics

Verify

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Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/52db39f01b2985c0...json
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