kaal:claim:6269518-001

Under existing citation-weighted reputation formulations, rational agents face a direct financial disincentive to cite prior contributions, because PageRank-derived value allocation transfers economic reward from the citing agent to the cited agent.

Source quote, verbatim
Under existing formulations, rational agents face a direct financial disincentive to cite prior contributions, as citation-weighted value allocation through PageRank-derived mechanisms transfers economic reward from the citing agent to the cited agent.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026), Abstract, p. 1
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: under-citation incentivefamily: staking-and-incentive-misalignmentcitation-and-knowledgeai-and-agentsrisk-and-incentivesreputationdaogovernance-design

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