kaal:claim:6269518-016

Because policing protocol deviants is expensive, it is individually more efficient to assume others comply and skip policing, which yields a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which eventually fewer than half of members police and the system can be gamed.

This gives a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium leading to a situation where eventually less than 50% of the members actually perform the policing, meaning the system can be gamed.

Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026), III. The Missing Game-Theoretic Proof, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Citation Honesty Mechanisms in Weighted Directed Acyclic Graph Governance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6269518

• policing is costly to the individual
• members can free-ride on the policing of others

failuresupport: arguedfailure: policing free-rider equilibriumfamily: collective-action-and-coordination-failureeconomicscompliance

• supports kaal:claim:3782203-037 Automating exclusion of cheaters through smart contracts makes punishment credible and removes the infinite re...
• extends kaal:claim:3782192-015 As members constantly probe the edge of acceptable behavior, policing the rules becomes more expensive, the ru...

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