kaal:claim:6421319-028

Contrary to the author's own prior version of this argument, Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy; it becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.

Nash equilibrium does not become irrelevant in the AI2AI economy. It becomes simultaneously more accurate as a description of individual agent behavior and more dangerous as a predictor of market outcomes.

Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026), VI.C. Nash's Equilibrium: From Anthropocentric Relic to Algorithmic Collusion Risk, p. 25
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, The Collapse of Scarcity Economics (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6421319

• supported by algorithmic collusion research in pricing games, Bertrand duopoly experiments, and financial trading

mechanismsupport: evidencedfailure: Algorithmic Collusion Riskfamily: ai-oversight-and-alignment-gapeconomicsreputation

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