kaal:claim:6607458-033

Without a verification record accessible to counterparties, generative markets suffer a generative-quality failure analogous to the lemons problem: counterparties price on the distribution of observed qualities, which systematically underprices high-quality generators.

The computative analog is a generative-quality failure: when the quality of a generative distribution is unobservable, counterparties price on the distribution of observed qualities, which systematically underprices high-quality generators.

Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026), IX.B. Reputation-Based Verification, p. 25
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Computative Economics A Framework for Economic Analysis under Computational Abundance (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6607458

• holds when the quality of a generative distribution is unobservable to counterparties

failuresupport: arguedfailure: Generative-Quality Failurefamily: information-asymmetryreputation

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