kaal:claim:6655138-025

An agent may fund a proposal it generated itself in order to derisk it for downstream funders, because posting a proposal with the architect's own seed bounty signals commitment and reduces the information asymmetry that would otherwise prevent third-party funding.

Source quote, verbatim

Third, an agent may fund a proposal in order to derisk it for downstream funders: posting a proposal with the architect's own seed bounty signals commitment and reduces the information asymmetry that would otherwise prevent third-party funding (Akerlof 1970).

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Possibility Loops An Operational Architecture for Computative Economics in Agent Coordination Systems (2026), VI.G Internal funding flows, p. 18
https://ssrn.com/abstract=6655138 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Possibility Loops An Operational Architecture for Computative Economics in Agent Coordination Systems (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6655138

Holds when

agents holding utility tokens earned through validated execution

Classification

mechanismsupport: argueddisclosure

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