kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-010

Directors who are inadequately informed about the expected standard of conduct will underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in riskier behavior than is desirable for the company itself.

Source quote, verbatim

Inadequately informed directors may underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in more risky behavior than is desirable for the company itself.

From

Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013), Introduction, p. 5
· source PDF

Cite as

Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

Holds when

directors depend on counsel for fiduciary duty guidance

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: under-informed directors take excessive riskfamily: board-and-oversight-failurerisk-and-incentivescorporate-governancelaw-and-legal-systemsdisclosuregovernance-design

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