kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-021

Traditional forward looking corporate governance systems adopt backward looking perspectives only after stable and optimal rules have emerged as suboptimal and require replacement or amendment.

Traditional forward-looking corporate governance systems may take backward-looking perspectives if and when stable and optimal rules emerge as suboptimal, requiring replacement and/or amendment of existing regulatory solutions.

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014), II.5 Dynamic Corporate Governance, p. 19
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Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Governmental Contracts (2014)

• traditional stable and presumptively optimal rulemaking infrastructure

failuresupport: arguedfailure: reactive backward looking correctionfamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationgovernance-designcorporate-governance

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