entity · derived
Anonymity
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying anonymity. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2317580-022 : Codes of conduct adopted under a CIA should encourage disclosure of compliance issues and protect whistle blowers from retaliation by maintaining the anonymity of disclosures.
- 2732915-007 : Guaranteeing complete anonymity is essential to obtaining a sufficient response rate from private fund advisers, but that guarantee prevents a broader descriptive statistical analysis of the sample.
- 2992962-001 : The existing legal infrastructure cannot address the legal challenges presented by crypto transaction disputes, because it is impossible to consistently identify the parties to a dispute arising from
- 2992962-004 : Personal jurisdiction technically still applies to parties transacting in encrypted distributed smart contracts, but the practicability of enforcement is impossible because physical identifiers are se
- 2992962-008 : Anonymity survives the blockchain's permanent public record because a new private key can be created for each transaction, so although public key addresses are stored eternally, each transaction allow
- 2992962-012 : Regulating blockchain through the non anonymous application of the technology creates large inefficiencies that will be bypassed by the more efficient anonymous applications, and it is for those more
- 2992962-013 : Proving personal jurisdiction over smart contracting parties by physical presence, domicile or place of business, consent, or minimum contacts becomes impossible, because none of these elements are kn
- 2992962-015 : Not all smart contracts are fully anonymous and untouchable by traditional jurisdictional means, because contracts with a physical performance element, such as peer to peer transportation, do not auto
- 2992962-023 : The legacy infrastructure bridge between fiat and crypto currencies accelerates the growth of the blockchain based economy and infrastructure, but it cannot curtail the anonymous nature of that econom
- 2992962-027 : Without strong external pressure from existing regulatory structures and a distributed jurisdiction responsive to that pressure, the anonymity of smart contracting will ultimately undermine the coding
- 2992962-028 : The first of the two core requirements the authors set for distributed jurisdiction is that the anonymity of blockchain based smart contracting be maintained as the technology evolves.
- 2992962-031 : As blockchain use grows, node operation will eventually require special equipment affordable only by large corporations in the existing legal infrastructure, creating the possibility of dangerous cent
- 2992962-040 : For crypto economy participants who wish to minimize the transaction costs of dual integration and retain anonymity, the authors' proposed open source platform ecosystem is more likely than all other
- 3002908-007 : Enforcement against the blockchain is unlikely to work because it is maintained and owned by a distributed group of anonymous users worldwide who would not likely recognize or comply with any legal au
- 3071378-030 : By establishing a network of transacting parties that trust each other despite anonymity, blockchain technology enables unbiased transactions and eliminates prejudices against minorities.
- 3071378-037 : Reputational penalties for non-performance in a DAO are entirely free from racial implications because token holders are unlikely to even know each other.
- 3125822-001 : The crypto economy can continue to develop without falling back on centralized regulating authorities only if two things exist: a system for evaluating reputation and trust, and a fair dispute resolut
- 3125822-032 : Parties to a smart contract must avoid asymmetric encumbrance of assets, because in an anonymous blockchain environment where assets cannot be recovered from parties further down the transaction tree,
- 3125827-010 : If a blockchain cannot restart or regenerate autonomously after going offline or losing most active nodes, it needs social coordination between nodes; that requirement threatens anonymity and forces r
- 3125827-011 : If block producers' identities are revealed, the supranational independence and security of the blockchain are threatened, because local jurisdictions can then exert legal power over block production.
- 3128900-046 : Because the reputation token staking mechanism supplies attack resistance directly, users need not verify their identity to complete micro tasks, which circumvents the costs, delays, and privacy surre
- 3227933-020 : Anonymity in blockchain organizations makes them prone to Sybil attacks and 51 percent attacks, and anonymity combined with autonomy has already produced hacks.
- 3227967-033 : Anonymity in blockchain organizations makes them prone to Sybil attacks and 51 percent attacks, and anonymity combined with autonomy has led to many hacks.
- 3266953-037 : Semada's biometric onboarding technology uses zero knowledge proofs so that users retain continuing anonymity once they are onboarded.
- 3373393-033 : Non-performance reputational penalties in a DAO are entirely free from racial or cultural biases, because the token holders imposing them are unlikely to even know each other.
- 3405401-003 : Smart contracts make decentralized commerce between anonymous parties possible because they provide automated contracting that self executes and self regulates according to mathematical strictures.
- 3406323-030 : Smart contracts enable anonymous parties to engage in decentralized commerce because automated contracting self-executes and self-regulates according to mathematical strictures, removing the need for
- 3441904-019 : Corruption is possible whenever actors in a governance design can be identified, and every historical instantiation of institutional governance design involving identifiable humans was afflicted by co
- 3441904-045 : Non performance reputational penalties in a DAO are free from racial and cultural biases because the token holders are unlikely to even know each other and work toward the common goal of optimizing th
- 3606663-018 : Anonymity in decentralized networks imposes a specific design constraint: system architects need a special skillset to navigate the limits that anonymity places on system design, and that skillset rem
- 3652481-005 : Reputational penalties for non performance in a DAO are free from racial and cultural bias, because token holders are unlikely even to know one another.
- 3782193-031 : Honesty would be the wrong strategy for an agent if the contract were anonymous and its resolution did not affect future contracts, because that situation is a single-stage zero-sum game in which stea
- 3782198-035 : Anonymity can exacerbate second and third order discrimination because it makes such discrimination more difficult to detect, so other governance mechanisms in a decentralized organization must be use
- 3782198-036 : The Tragedy of the Commons is a natural consequence of allowing anonymous participation, which is why the unfiltered layers of platforms such as Twitter, YouTube comments, and Reddit display toxic res
- 3782198-038 : The r/place experiment showed that anonymous groups can self correct: each time a hate symbol such as a swastika appeared on the shared canvas, it was replaced with something more positive.
- 3782203-024 : If the decentralized economy is constructed as a zero-sum game, cooperation becomes impossible because the only feasible long-term strategy is maximal extraction, and participants are incentivized to
- 3782203-033 : Anonymity increases rather than decreases the value of reputation tokens, because when potential business partners have less knowledge of a counterparty's identity, the number of reputation tokens hel
- 3782203-035 : A DAO permitting anonymous membership is exposed to a sockpuppet attack in which one account behaves honestly while another cheats, and if the cheating account can funnel its gains to the honest accou
- 3782210-007 : As a network grows its members become more anonymous and individually less important, which makes cheating more locally enticing and less globally noticeable, so the system eventually collapses once c
- 3782210-010 : Reducing member anonymity weakens rather than strengthens a decentralized network, because personal privacy protects members and lets them be more transparent in their dealings without fear of victimi
- 3782210-025 : Sockpuppet attacks are inevitable in any organization that wants open membership and anonymous members, and since those properties are essential to the autonomy that makes a global decentralized organ
- 3782210-042 : Self-executing, self-regulating smart contracts between anonymous parties in an open system create a near perfect zero-sum situation unless the DAO also includes reputation.
- 3782216-036 : The inability of anonymous participants to trust one another is crippling the DeFi market and forces decentralized markets into overcollateralization, giving traditional markets a fundamental advantag
- 3799320-015 : The identity of actors in a DAO governance design is itself a source of corruption, so merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.
- 3981021-034 : Anonymity increases the value of the reputation token, because as information asymmetries and incomplete information increase, the value of the information that derives from reputation tokens increase
- 3981021-036 : Commonly used identifiers such as social media profiles and credit scores play less of a role in the DAO voting design, and the resulting more equal distribution of power allows the inclusion of const
- 4067783-024 : Anonymous decentralized networks can encourage troll behavior because participants feel safe attacking others without retribution, and in a DAO that trolling destabilizes the organization and creates
- 4067783-025 : The friction generated by anonymous trolling can be mitigated through incentivized reputational architecture governed by protocols the community itself decides on, so anonymity does not have to corrup
- 4067783-026 : Properly implemented anonymity strengthens decentralized governance because it lets individuals relate without the inherited biases of predecessor generations and a lifetime inside centralized power s
- 4067783-027 : Anonymity lets information flow from the edges of the system, from individuals who would have no agency in centralized structures, and such inputs are much less likely to materialize if DAO participan
- 4067783-028 : True anonymity remains eternally difficult to attain with existing web3 technology, yet anonymity in DAO governance is the holy grail of decentralized web3 business and society.
- 4734750-040 : Reputation token staking substitutes for identity verification: because staking makes the network attack resistant, workers can complete micro tasks without verifying identity, which removes the cost,
- 5254152-033 : Some DAOs substitute anonymity for legal structure: without any legal registration, Olympus DAO relies on anonymity to avoid legal action, which the author scores as the weakest possible regulatory co
- 5554218-022 : Automating smart contracts under the code is law paradigm incentivizes unethical behavior by enabling anonymous, opportunistic action, which reduces repeat business and undermines the minimization of
- 5554218-023 : The absence of accountability mechanisms in anonymous, automated smart contracts encourages a take the money and run mentality, which makes a historical record of conduct and incentives for ethical be
- 5554218-037 : A reputation system in which participants who act in good faith earn reputation credits and those acting opportunistically face penalties mitigates the take the money and run mentality that anonymity