entity · derived
Blockchain governance
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying blockchain-governance. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 3125827-001 : No single, fixed, entirely algorithmic policing solution can completely prevent independent nodes in a distributed system from gaming block production to advantage some parties over others. Any consen
- 3125827-019 : Any blockchain whose soft forks are decided through private communication between famous token holding whales is ultimately less secure than legacy centralized systems, which at least address centrali
- 3441904-005 : Forking a chain is an insufficient governance mechanism, and even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice as a substitute for evolutionary blockchain governance protocol
- 3441904-025 : If a community cannot agree after a hard fork on which chain is the true chain, the result can be two blockchains competing in perpetuity, and the only viable remedy is abandoning one branch, which ca
- 3782198-025 : Bitcoin and Ethereum have no formal binding governance framework declaring how consensus protocols may be changed in the future, which the authors identify as a deep flaw that weakens the networks and
- 3782203-010 : Because a group sometimes genuinely has no consensus to be discovered, network forking is at times inevitable rather than a governance failure that better rules could prevent.
- 3808873-033 : Decentralized networks depend on dynamic governance because evolving blockchain protocols require updates, and the practice of hardforking that remained prevalent in the early 2020s created significan