entity · derived
Corporate integrity agreements
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying corporate-integrity-agreements. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2273857-013 : Although implementing dynamic elements in regulatory structures remains uncertain, promising regulatory tools with dynamic elements already exist, including contingent capital securities, corporate in
- 2273857-064 : Corporate integrity agreements improve corporate governance because the ease of reopened prosecution, increased government scrutiny, and the potential for crippling penalties improve boards' and manag
- 2273857-065 : The threat of heightened scrutiny under a deferred prosecution or corporate integrity agreement optimizes incentives because increased government monitoring attaches only after a first time offense, g
- 2317580-003 : The decades long academic debate over improving fiduciary duty doctrine has overlooked Corporate Integrity Agreements entirely, even though the debate is otherwise framed as a choice between expanding
- 2317580-004 : Corporate Integrity Agreements are a hybrid instrument: they are compliance programs funded by health care companies but administratively enforced by the government, that is, contracts between health
- 2317580-005 : Because directors contractually agree to increase compliance through an open door policy for the government, CIAs substantially raise the liability risk for companies whose directors did not act in ac
- 2317580-007 : The contractual obligations contained in CIAs can enhance directors' default fiduciary duties, expanding the duty of care for directors of health care corporations beyond the legal standard set by Car
- 2317580-011 : Noncompliance with a CIA carries serious penalties, because the OIG may prosecute the company or seek its exclusion from federal health care programs.
- 2317580-013 : Certification requirements that compel directors and officers to certify compliance with a CIA's provisions lower the procedural and enforcement hurdles for pursuing increased sanctions against noncom
- 2317580-015 : CIAs often become the benchmark for expected conduct in a subsequent civil or criminal trial, which distinguishes them from ordinary contractual arrangements between companies and the government.
- 2317580-016 : Once a CIA has been executed it is much easier for the government to reopen a case than to pursue a new one, and this ease of further prosecution, combined with increased OIG scrutiny and the threat o
- 2317580-018 : If the government finds problems on inspection it can escalate beyond the CIA's own substantive provisions to criminal prosecution, fines, additional CIAs, and exclusion from federally funded health c
- 2317580-019 : CIAs reach into the day to day compliance operations of corporations by elevating the chief compliance officer, typically mandating the appointment of a CCO who reports directly to the CEO rather than
- 2317580-020 : By prescribing the number of board meetings devoted to compliance review and requiring specific board resolutions, CIA provisions let the government contractually determine how and when a board will i
- 2317580-021 : Certification requirements push directors to demand more detailed reports from corporate officers and to take a greater role in overseeing compliance with both the CIA and federal regulations.
- 2317580-023 : The additional CIA requirements, and especially the self-reporting provisions, force companies to spend additional resources and at times to alter their day to day operations after signing.
- 2317580-024 : Although CIAs are not laws, they go beyond aspirational governance standards because they set forth concrete governance rules that more clearly define the duties to be informed, to exercise oversight,
- 2317580-025 : Unlike private contracts, CIAs are not the product of genuine bargaining choice: companies execute them to avoid further prosecution and exclusion from Medicaid and Medicare, so that once the governme
- 2317580-027 : Boards are consistently held not liable for their companies' illegal marketing efforts even though federal law prohibits off-label marketing, but a board that certifies compliance with a CIA is certif
- 2317580-031 : Courts treat companies that executed a CIA differently from other companies, and are increasingly recognizing the role of CIAs and their implications for directors' fiduciary duties.
- 2317580-032 : When a company operates under a CIA, the judicial distinction between the law and aspirational corporate governance becomes less clear.
- 2317580-035 : Courts assume that the boards of companies that executed a CIA have more knowledge and can exercise more control, and therefore hold those directors to a heightened fiduciary duty, rejecting directors
- 2317580-039 : As a unique hybrid category, CIAs transcend both the law of fiduciary duties and aspirational corporate governance, and courts may come to interpret CIAs and other hybrid forms such as deferred prosec
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-036 : Corporate Integrity Agreements are one form of dynamic governance that may be able to temporarily increase fiduciary duties as a form of quasi law.