entity · derived
Feedback effects
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying feedback-effects. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2267560-001 : Dynamic regulation is an optimization process for the learning experience in the New Institutional Economics framework, describing intra- and inter-jurisdictional feedback effects between different pu
- 2267560-007 : The feedback effect between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers reduces incomplete information, which in turn enables the rulemaker to modify the next action in the r
- 2267560-009 : Rules with suboptimal characteristics are themselves the product of institutional arrangements and reinforce those suboptimal institutional arrangements and rulemaking processes, creating a self-perpe
- 2267560-011 : Rules that lack adaptability to future states of the world reinforce the very institutions and processes that produce suboptimal outcomes.
- 2267560-015 : Under dynamic regulation a presumption of reform feasibility is unnecessary because the feedback effect makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete, curtailing centralized planning and minimizing unintended actio
- 2267560-016 : Because feedback effects increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information, rulemakers can predict unforeseen contingencies and adjust their actions ex-ante to avoid complex
- 2267560-021 : Opportunities for integrating dynamic elements into the rulemaking process include intra-jurisdictional feedback processes, feedback effects between private and public rulemakers, inter-jurisdictional
- 2267560-022 : Parties subject to informal rules signal their preferences and efficient solutions to the public rulemaker, so informal rules and practices supply additional information that modifies rulemakers' acti
- 2267560-028 : The feedback process between public and private rulemakers increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to the public rulemaker, which induces and supports a learning p
- 2267560-029 : Competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, but it nevertheless provides incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory soluti
- 2267560-030 : Because competition between legislators requires public rulemakers to meet consumers' and legal addressees' quality expectations and preferences, it adds a dynamic and market-driven element with a fee
- 2267560-031 : Consumer opt-out from existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker: when a critical mass of opt-outs signals that a different rule may be optimal, it triggers a modification of th
- 2267560-032 : Information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information, unlike feedback effects between private and public rulemakers.
- 2267560-034 : Contractual incompleteness can be lowered through dynamic processes within the rulemaking process, because dynamic elements improve the availability, timeliness, and quality of information via the fee
- 2267560-041 : Contracting parties need to postpone the specification of obligations only if the feedback process in the dynamic framework did not generate sufficient information; where sufficient information is ava
- 2267560-043 : The availability of information generated through the dynamic feedback process cannot be optimized at any given point in time, because the feedback effect is intended to perpetually reinforce itself.
- 2267560-046 : Dynamic regulation helps rulemakers anticipate how institutions will react to circumstances as they arise, because the feedback process provides decentralized, timely, and institution-specific informa
- 2267560-047 : The broad scope for contractual incompleteness and delayed decision-making stipulated by the incomplete contract model are necessary only if the feedback effect did not produce sufficient information
- 2267560-051 : The combination of multiple feedback processes results in a sequence of mutually-reinforcing, information-enhancing events that minimizes ex-post trial-and-error experimentation with stable rules afte
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-001 : Dynamic regulation is a supplemental regulatory tool, not a replacement for existing rulemaking: it increases the availability of relevant, institution specific, and decentralized information for rule
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-012 : Interaction and exchange of emerging information between public and private rulemakers creates a feedback process that increases the availability, timeliness, and quality of information available to t
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-013 : The existing framework of stable and presumptively optimal rules is self reinforcing: it perpetuates rulemaking processes that produce stable presumptively optimal rules and therefore keeps generating
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-014 : Feedback effects allow the necessary information to be acquired ex ante and necessary revisions to be anticipated before rules emerge as suboptimal, rather than ex post after failure has become appare
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-031 : Feedback processes associated with governmental contracts lower contractual incompleteness, because they raise the availability, timeliness, and quality of information while lowering the cost of contr
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-033 : Self reporting supplies institution specific information from which the government can identify governance shortcomings in the reporting entity and draw conclusions about regulatory needs across the e
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-034 : Preemptive remedial measures have a low success rate, as evidenced by the fact that more than 60 percent of deferred and non prosecution agreements executed between 1993 and 2013 refer to preemptive r
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-035 : Negotiation of a governmental contract produces indirect information transfers, because the government can deduce from where the corporate wrongdoer places negotiating emphasis which governance shortc
- kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-036 : Regulators can extract industry specific guidance for rulemaking from the quantity of governmental contracts executed in a given industry and from the frequency of particular industry specific terms i
- 2740477-004 : Dynamic regulation is defined as the study of regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution specific and decentralized information to generate feedback ef
- 2740477-005 : Venture capital can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation because venture capitalists' financial allocations to innovative projects generate feedback that regulators ca
- 2740477-029 : Dynamic regulatory tools let rulemakers adapt to regulatory contingencies as they arise, because feedback effects deliver relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution specific information ex ante.
- 2740477-031 : Private rulemakers hold a comparative advantage over public rulemakers because, unlike their public counterparts, they can produce the comparable, decentralized, and institution specific information t
- 2808132-005 : Dynamic regulation is defined as conceptualizing regulatory phenomena in relation to both preceding and succeeding events, using institution-specific and decentralized information to generate feedback
- 2808132-006 : Data derived from venture capital investments can function as a dynamic regulatory supplement for disruptive innovation, because venture capital's financial allocations to innovative projects supply f
- 2808132-031 : Unrestricted exchange of information between public and private rulemakers creates regulatory synergies that increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information for rulemaking
- 2808132-032 : Through feedback effects, rulemakers in a dynamic regulatory framework can adopt rules that are adaptable to future states of the world rather than fixed to current conditions.
- 2808132-033 : Dynamic regulatory tools lower unforeseen contingencies in rulemaking because the feedback effect supplies relevant, timely, decentralized, and institution-specific information ex ante, allowing rulem
- 2808132-044 : Feedback effects from venture capitalists' finance allocations toward innovative products give rulemakers timely, decentralized, industry-specific and entity-specific information that allows them to a
- 2831040-021 : Deferred prosecution agreements produce superior feedback effects for regulation because the prosecutor's investigation and the negotiation and execution of the agreement signal regulatory needs in re
- 2831040-025 : Early regulatory intervention becomes unnecessary in a dynamic regulatory framework, because the regulatory challenges associated with innovation would become transparent in real time through improved
- 2831040-026 : In the dynamic regulatory framework, feedback effects and real time information permit regulatory intervention if and only when it is needed, which avoids stunting innovation through negative early si
- 2831040-032 : Anticipatory rulemaking in the dynamic framework is accomplished by combining institution specific, decentralized, and timely information with feedback effects, which can occur between public and priv
- 2831040-037 : Consumer choice adds a dynamic element to rulemaking because once consumers opt out of a suboptimal regulatory regime, public rulemakers in that jurisdiction can adjust their rulemaking in response, c
- 2831040-040 : Regulation of innovation in a dynamic framework is triggered only as a supplement to the existing rulemaking framework, and only if and when feedback effects anticipate otherwise unforeseen contingenc
- 2957645-001 : Contingent capital securities are a largely overlooked dynamic regulatory mechanism, and their regulatory value lies in their capacity to generate feedback effects, optimized timing, and improved info
- 2957645-010 : Feedback effects, defined as informational exchange processes between public and private rulemakers, between outcomes and institutions, between rules and rulemaking processes, and across jurisdictions
- 2957645-011 : Feedback effects change the timing of regulatory information: instead of acquiring necessary information only after rules have already proven suboptimal, they increase the availability of relevant inf
- 2957645-012 : Anticipatory regulation, which uses institution-specific and timely information together with feedback effects to create new rules, can minimize costly and suboptimal ex-post trial-and-error experimen
- 2957645-013 : Deferred prosecution agreements and venture capital investment decisions function as dynamic regulatory tools because they increase the availability of relevant, decentralized, and timely information
- 2957645-025 : Contingent capital qualifies as a dynamic regulatory mechanism because capital injection is available only if and when needed and because the conversion of contingent capital securities into near wort
- 2957645-027 : Contingent capital creates feedback effects because the conversion of debt to equity signals to regulators that the entity's management was unable to avoid the trigger, which is itself a call for incr
- 2957645-031 : Most of the design features of contingent capital securities and their triggering events remain underdeveloped, yet despite these shortcomings such securities could still help regulators anticipate re
- 2998097-019 : Rules become adaptable when institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including feedback between industry and regulators, that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized info
- 3396522-015 : A well established stable cryptocurrency and a universal exchange form a positive feedback loop: the exchange's liquidity is enhanced by the stable cryptocurrency, and the stable currency's stability
- 3396522-025 : Because hardcoded cryptocurrency policy is transparent and therefore predictable, market participants can anticipate policy and adjust behavior in advance, and such anticipatory reactions could over t
- 3402701-015 : Because bonds sell below their redemption value, an open-ended bond queue grows without bound, depressing bond prices and creating a positive feedback loop that ends in a death spiral and failure of t
- 3406323-002 : Because information flow in decentralized systems is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, such systems mutate and change easily, which makes them more attack resistant and allows them to grow v
- 3411897-003 : Decentralized systems mutate and change easily because their information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, and this capacity to mutate is what makes them more attack resistant on mul
- 3411897-004 : The five types of decentralization, governmental and regulatory, technological, organizational, market, and societal, are not independent: as one type proliferates it progressively affects the others
- 3441904-008 : Decentralized systems become more attack resistant and grow quickly because their information flow is optimized through dynamic feedback effects, which lets them mutate and change very easily.
- 3441904-009 : DAOs can be more productive than hierarchical organizations because their information allocation and feedback effects allow them to distribute the optimal amount of power to the optimal talent at the
- 3441904-034 : Feedback effects in decentralized systems raise the availability of relevant information for governance rules ex ante and allow necessary revisions to be anticipated before rules emerge as suboptimal,
- 3441904-036 : Ex post code based majoritarian rules generated by DAOs are superior to ex ante majoritarian default rules because they rest on more accurate real time information from the edge and decentralized feed
- 3782191-019 : Information in decentralized systems originates at the edges and is optimized through feedback: peers who receive information transmit its changed relevance back to the original generator, who evaluat
- 3808852-001 : The six types of decentralization are not independent: each is subject to its own iterative process and affects the others through feedback effects, so proliferation in one type progressively changes
- 3808852-041 : As each form of decentralization empowers heightened proliferation of the other forms, individuals perceive more opportunities for changes in consumer behavior, silent withdrawal, disengagement, and d
- 3808852-042 : The crypto movement illustrates the feedback effects between types of decentralization: its political philosophy could not be instantiated without technological decentralization in the form of cryptoc
- 3949098-011 : The delayed voting outcomes and feedback effects created by the transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled voting let DAOIC members triangulate their own internal liquidity position against de
- 3981021-017 : Forum comments let existing voting associates identify the most competent commenters and invite them to apply for membership by providing work for a grant, creating constant onboarding feedback effect
- 4855607-028 : The interaction between transformer models and the web3 community forms an evolutionary feedback loop in which community input shapes model development and the improved models return better service to
- 4855607-030 : The feedback effects that make community governance of federated learning work will not materialize unless expert community members are selected coherently, making coherent expert selection a precondi
- 4855607-031 : A precedent and citation WDAG accounting system documents and traces every adjustment to a federated learning model, and that full accounting is what enables dynamic feedback effects and the rapid int
- 4855607-032 : GNNs and web3 systems optimize each other through mutual feedback effects, and it is this bidirectional learning, rather than one system merely serving the other, that produces an evolutionary dynamic