entity · derived
Form adv
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying form-adv. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2150377-009 : Revised Form ADV requires advisers to report gross rather than net regulatory assets under management and narrows their discretion to include or exclude assets, so the registration threshold becomes h
- 2150377-015 : Mandated disclosure does not automatically produce usable public data: although Form ADV requires advisers to disclose chief compliance officer contact information, the SEC dataset omitted it and cont
- 2150377-019 : Comparison of the responding sample against the full registered population on Form ADV parameters shows the sample is not biased toward any particular subgroup of hedge fund advisers, and gives no ind
- 2150377-039 : Mandatory reporting does not guarantee informative reporting: anecdotal evidence indicates that advisers can present the information required in Forms ADV and PF in ways that in effect flatten out and
- 2337268-019 : Part 2 of Form ADV requires a plain English narrative brochure for prospective advisory customers, making the brochure the primary disclosure document delivered to an adviser's clients.
- 2337268-020 : Mandatory disclosure of referral compensation, related person status of brokers and dealers, and soft dollar benefits is designed to defuse conflicts of interest arising when an adviser runs several t
- 2337268-022 : Form PF filings, unlike Form ADV filings, are confidential and not publicly available, so the systemic risk disclosure regime is built for regulators rather than for market or investor scrutiny.
- 2389416-040 : The SEC's collection of proprietary hedge fund data through Forms ADV and PF does not negatively affect the performance of the hedge fund industry as a whole, and appears to affect only a subset of th
- 2811718-001 : The study rests on two datasets: SEC Form ADV Part II filings by private investment fund advisers from 2007 to 2014 (N=100392) and the publicly available litigation record on private fund investor due
- 2811718-007 : Because a material omission or misstatement in Form ADV Part 2A can support a serious securities law charge, private fund managers have an incentive to keep the narrative language of that required dis
- 2811718-008 : From 2007 to 2014 an increasing number of Form ADV Part II filers deemed investor due diligence worth mentioning, and an increasing number of filers qualitatively increased their due diligence disclos
- 2811718-009 : Since 2010 an increasing number of SEC Form ADV Part II brochure filers included investor due diligence disclosures, but the number of filers including such disclosures remained relatively even betwee
- 2811718-010 : The intensity of due diligence mentioning relative to total Form ADV Part II brochure filings increased substantially, and the due diligence count exceeded the total number of ADV II filings for the f
- 2811718-011 : Form ADV Part II filings jumped from 3,024 in 2010 to 21,685 in 2011, and that jump was accompanied by a corresponding increase both in the number of filings mentioning investor due diligence and in t
- 2811718-012 : Although overall Form ADV Part II filings fell between 2012 and 2013, due diligence counts fell only marginally, from 20,828 to 20,031, and filings mentioning due diligence fell from 7,862 to 7,198, l
- 2811718-013 : The Form ADV analysis is limited because the term due diligence carries multiple possible meanings, so counts of the term cannot by themselves distinguish among those meanings.
- 2811718-035 : The data suggest that since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engage in investor due diligence in order to protect themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits.
- 2816408-028 : To sharpen assignment to treatment and control, actual registration histories were pulled from the SEC's IAPD website and historical Form ADV data and combined with Morningstar variables to build two
- 2998097-029 : Since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engaged in investor due diligence partly to protect themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits, rather than in response to regulatory mandate.