entity · derived

Fsoc

36 claims across 9 works, 2012–2017.

Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying fsoc. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.

Every claim under this term

• 2150377-010 2012 empirical: Form PF reporting achieves broad coverage of systemic exposure with narrow coverage of firms: the SEC expects the small set of large filers to account for eighty percent of total hedge fund assets und
• 2150377-011 2012 design: Quarterly rather than annual Form PF updating for large hedge fund advisers is designed for timeliness: its purpose is to give the Financial Stability Oversight Council data current enough to identify
• 2150377-040 2012 failure: If advisers sanitize their Form ADV and Form PF filings, the disclosures become less useful for FSOC and SEC evaluation and undermine the very determination of systemic risk posed by private funds tha
• 2337268-021 2013 design: Form PF was created to improve SEC and CFTC investigations and examinations and to enable the Financial Stability Oversight Council to monitor systemic risk in U.S. financial markets.
• 2337268-024 2013 design: Quarterly rather than annual reporting by large private fund advisers is intended to give the FSOC data timely enough to identify emerging systemic risk trends.
• 2348463-017 2013 design: Mandatory quarterly Form PF reporting for large hedge fund advisers is designed to give the Financial Stability Oversight Council timely data for identifying emerging systemic risk trends and to align
• 2348463-022 2013 failure: Form PF disclosures have not been standardized, and anecdotal evidence indicates that the SEC and the FSOC may be working with contradictory, misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete systemic risk data.
• 2389416-011 2014 design: The quarterly Form PF reporting obligation imposed on hedge fund advisers with more than $1.5 billion in regulatory assets under management is designed to give the FSOC timely data for identifying sys
• 2470008-001 2014 failure: The SEC data collected from private fund advisers feeds every stage of the FSOC's systemic risk assessment, and the FSOC leans most heavily on precisely those disclosure items that are the most proble
• 2470008-002 2014 failure: Accuracy and consistency problems in the SEC's private fund data collection can impair the FSOC's ability to evaluate the systemic risk posed by private fund advisers.
• 2470008-003 2014 empirical: Prior studies and anecdotal evidence indicate that the data collection mandated by Form PF could itself create problems for the FSOC when it evaluates hedge fund systemic risk.
• 2470008-014 2014 design: Form PF data was tailored primarily for the FSOC rather than for the SEC's own purposes, a design choice that shaped the level of reporting required.
• 2470008-015 2014 empirical: The FSOC's powers over nonbank financial institutions are broad and without precedent in United States financial regulation.
• 2470008-016 2014 mechanism: The quantitative measures used in systemic risk assessment are not codified in statute, so the FSOC can alter its thresholds and its analysis through rulemaking.
• 2470008-017 2014 condition: Commonly managed investment funds holding $50 billion or more in aggregate total consolidated assets can be designated systemically important, and following a similar investment strategy across those
• 2470008-018 2014 mechanism: Stage one of the FSOC's designation process is a mechanical screen: six quantitative thresholds filter out nonbank financial institutions unlikely to pose significant systemic risk before any institut
• 2470008-020 2014 mechanism: The FSOC's three stage SIFI review process depends heavily on information that private fund investment advisers supply through Form PF.
• 2470008-021 2014 mechanism: Form PF information addresses most of the FSOC's stage one thresholds either directly or indirectly, so the mechanical screen runs largely on adviser reported data.
• 2470008-027 2014 empirical: The FSOC itself conceded that available data was insufficient when it tried to identify the activities of the twenty largest United States fund managers as possible sources of systemic risk.
• 2470008-033 2014 failure: Because several core Form PF questions feeding the FSOC's stage one threshold screen are themselves defective, the FSOC's systemic risk assessment process could be compromised.
• 2470008-034 2014 failure: Because the FSOC uses RAUM related valuations directly and indirectly to set stage one thresholds, and because RAUM requires substantial filer interpretation, it is questionable whether the FSOC can u
• 2470008-035 2014 failure: The Form PF counterparty questions most affected by filer interpretation, Questions 22 and 23, are the very ones the FSOC uses in stage two to determine the interconnectedness of private funds.
• 2470008-037 2014 condition: If the FSOC relies on inaccurate Form PF data in its systemic risk assessment, its work on private funds may itself be erroneous.
• 2470008-038 2014 failure: Private fund advisers reporting under Form PF encountered issues that could affect the FSOC's systemic risk assessment, but the author does not claim that the FSOC is unable to fulfill its congression
• 2470008-039 2014 failure: Matching the identified Form PF defects against the FSOC's specific uses of that data suggests possible inaccuracies in the FSOC's systemic risk assessment process, although the author disclaims scien
• 2470008-040 2014 normative: Fixing the identified problems with Form PF data would help optimize the FSOC's systemic risk assessment of private funds.
• 2715083-004 2016 mechanism: Lifting the advertising ban for hedge fund advisers under the JOBS Act, combined with FSOC treating mutual and hedge funds alike for SIFI designation, effectively assimilated the advertising requireme
• 2715083-026 2016 failure: FSOC's SIFI designation framework does not distinguish between mutual and hedge funds, even though evidence indicates designation would have disparate effects on the two asset classes.
• 2748096-027 2016 empirical: The FSOC's powers over hedge funds and other nonbank financial institutions are broad and unprecedented in U.S. financial regulation, including the power to subject hedge funds to extensive Federal Re
• 2748096-028 2016 failure: The SIFI designation regime does not reach hedge funds in practice: because the asset threshold is set high, at $50 billion or more in aggregate total consolidated assets, hedge funds are unlikely to
• 2816408-013 2016 design: The quarterly Form PF reporting obligation imposed on advisers with more than $1.5 billion in regulatory assets under management attributable to private funds exists to give the FSOC timely data for i
• 2998097-014 2017 failure: Because advisers and third party service providers can flatten out and sanitize the information disclosed in Forms ADV and PF, the resulting disclosures may be less useful to the FSOC and the SEC in d
• 2998097-021 2017 failure: The SEC's private fund data collection encountered accuracy and consistency problems that hampered the FSOC's ability to evaluate the systemic risk of private funds.
• 2998097-022 2017 failure: The FSOC relied most heavily on some of the most problematic disclosure items the SEC collects, even though SEC data played a crucial role at every stage of its systemic risk assessment of private fun
• 2998097-024 2017 failure: Several core Form PF questions that feed the FSOC's stage one threshold assessment are defective, most importantly because the definition of RAUM required substantive interpretation by the filers them
• 2998097-025 2017 failure: If the FSOC relies on Form PF data that is subject to inaccuracies, because uncertain filers complete the form using estimates and assumptions, then the FSOC's own work on private funds may in turn be

json · markdown · entity index