entity · derived
Institutional design
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying institutional-design. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 2267560-002 : Dynamic elements in the rulemaking process increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking and thereby improve institutional design.
- 2267560-003 : Dynamic regulation as part of institutional design in the evolution of law has not been systematically analyzed, despite an existing economics literature applying dynamic regulation to telecommunicati
- 2267560-004 : The institutional infrastructure for rulemaking was designed for a relatively stable society and stable economic and market environments, and it therefore fails to keep pace with rapidly evolving and
- 2267560-009 : Rules with suboptimal characteristics are themselves the product of institutional arrangements and reinforce those suboptimal institutional arrangements and rulemaking processes, creating a self-perpe
- 2267560-010 : Even institutional arrangements that produce optimal governance solutions generate solutions that become suboptimal over time, necessitating rule revision, updating, and revocation.
- 2267560-011 : Rules that lack adaptability to future states of the world reinforce the very institutions and processes that produce suboptimal outcomes.
- 2267560-012 : Rules can be adaptable only if the institutions and rulemaking processes that produce them integrate dynamic elements that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking.
- 2267560-013 : Dynamic regulation is a form of Popper's piecemeal social engineering rather than holistic or utopian social engineering, because it is a piecemeal optimization process for institutional design with a
- 2267560-039 : The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking are likely to persist, which makes alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking more relevant.
- 2267560-040 : Dynamic regulation should supplement existing institutional designs for rulemaking in order to counteract the negative consequences of cyclical rulemaking and improve corresponding institutional desig
- 2273857-050 : The social and mental properties of decision makers in financial institutions, combined with the incentive structure of the respective institutional setup, determine a financial institution's adaptive
- 2740477-017 : The existing regulatory infrastructure, including Congress, agencies, self regulatory bodies, and the regulation literature itself, relies almost exclusively on stable and presumptively optimal rules.
- 2808132-020 : The historically evolved rulemaking infrastructure could cope with its own collective action problems, regulatory cycles, and trial-and-error rulemaking without major disruption because the scope of r
- 2831040-017 : The doctrine of stare decisis and judicial adherence to precedent decided decades or centuries earlier mean the court system is structurally a suspension system for rapid change, built to supply stabi
- 3782192-039 : Money and contracts are worthless in business with counterparties who cannot be trusted to keep a bargain, so decentralized commerce requires a system in which reputation means something.
- 3782205-001 : A radically decentralized economy cannot be achieved incrementally: eight institutional problems that centralized business solved centuries ago must all be solved simultaneously, and their solutions m
- 3782205-007 : Core institutions are perceived as leaching from the economy only because of corruption, and well designed systems eliminate those economic frictions.
- 3782205-009 : The governance architecture designed for one decentralized institution can be ported to many other DAOs with only superficial changes, so institutional design effort is reusable across the ecosystem.
- 3782214-002 : Corruption has arisen in every organizational circumstance in recorded history, including the least extreme case of identified members of a single culture interacting face to face with deep community
- 3799320-013 : Effective institutional governance requires a duality of incentives, namely incentives for actors to improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the
- 4529715-012 : There is no consistent standard for DAO governance, which pushes each DAO to invent its own structure, and because decentralized governance is complex many of those structures fail to become truly dec
- 5886442-028 : The author concedes that the institutions he previously advocated, including dynamic regulation, contingent capital, agile sandboxes and Web3 reputation systems, become at best transitional bridges fo
- 5886442-034 : Realizing the post Coasean horizon without succumbing to algorithmic feudalism requires deliberate institutional design, including equitable data governance, symbiotic human and machine constitutions
- 6244278-001 : Contemporary AI's incapacity for authentic judgment under irreducible uncertainty is an institutional deficit rather than a computational one: an agent that bears no consequence for its errors cannot
- 6244278-002 : Correctly designed institutional incentive structures produce emergent properties that are functionally equivalent to ethical agency, without requiring consciousness or programmed morality.
- 6244278-008 : Rather than trying to endow AI with consciousness, embodiment, or sentience, the proposed framework engineers the institutional conditions under which consequence becomes a structural feature of agent
- 6421319-012 : The correct response to the binding constraint cascade is rigorous decentralization of the compute and energy infrastructure underpinning AI production, pursued through decentralized compute networks,
- 6607458-030 : The AI alignment problem is, within this framework, a foundational policy problem of Computative Economics rather than an adjacent engineering concern, because objective function governance determines