entity · derived
Regulatory competition
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying regulatory-competition. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 617681-001 : Bundling substantive corporate law together with adjudication, the arrangement that succeeded in Delaware, is likely to cause difficulties in Europe; Member States are most likely to succeed in post C
- 617681-002 : Under the seat theory, competition with respect to corporate law alone is impractical, because a corporation cannot choose a state's corporate law without also locating its principal place of business
- 617681-006 : Rule switching costs for a jurisdiction are probably higher when it must make substantial new demands on its courts in addition to changing its statutes, which raises the cost of competing with a bund
- 617681-008 : Regulatory competition for a bundled product of statutes plus courts is only a realistic possibility if relatively high supply side hurdles can be overcome to induce states to enter the market for cor
- 617681-010 : For an unbundled product of statutes only, the key to successful regulatory competition shifts from the supply side to the demand side: drafting statutes that appeal to large numbers of managers and i
- 617681-011 : The quality problems in Delaware adjudication mean it is not a foregone conclusion that the bundled product of statutes plus specialized courts leads to optimal results.
- 1806252-001 : Contrary to critics who blame the Basel Accords, harmonization through Basel II is not what made banks hold similar assets; banks held similar assets because those assets were profitable.
- 1998455-027 : Where jurisdictions are not compelled to agree on the same rule, some jurisdiction will try a different rule, and will do so more quickly, when changed economic circumstances make a different rule opt
- 2061166-037 : Convergence of contingent capital standards is impeded by a first mover problem: single jurisdictions hesitate to impose contingent capital requirements before they know how competing jurisdictions an
- 2267560-029 : Competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, but it nevertheless provides incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory soluti
- 2267560-030 : Because competition between legislators requires public rulemakers to meet consumers' and legal addressees' quality expectations and preferences, it adds a dynamic and market-driven element with a fee
- 2831040-037 : Consumer choice adds a dynamic element to rulemaking because once consumers opt out of a suboptimal regulatory regime, public rulemakers in that jurisdiction can adjust their rulemaking in response, c
- 2834531-030 : In a world where regulatory competition is the new normal, regulators can pay a heavy economic price for being overly cautious or for abandoning the attempt to establish a meaningful basis for regulat
- 2834531-037 : Regulatory experimentation matters within a single jurisdiction and not only across jurisdictions, because it gives regulators data on the real world effects of a particular regulatory scheme in a com
- 3652481-002 : A jurisdiction is only truly favorable to DAOs if it grants the DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without requiring any representative in that jurisdiction.
- 3799320-004 : Only a jurisdiction that grants a DAO limited liability as an entity and accepts its independent status without requiring representation can be truly favorable to DAO concepts.
- 5554218-015 : Harmonizing substantive law would suppress jurisdictional diversity by imposing a one size fits all model that ignores cultural, economic, and technological differences, thereby reducing the resilienc