entity · derived
Risk taking
Derived node: assembled mechanically from the claims carrying risk-taking. A roster, not an adjudicated definition.
Every claim under this term
- 1558614-003 : Contesting the view that the 2008 crisis was an American problem inflicted on foreign victims, the authors argue that non U.S. institutions such as German banks were willing participants in the risk t
- 1558614-014 : The U.S. governance structure, built on periodic disclosure of performance data and stock price maximization, encourages risk taking because managers feel compelled to meet shareholder expectations at
- 1908473-014 : The incentive effects of corporate governance controls may not operate in systemically important financial institutions, because managers and owners who anticipate a bailout commitment adjust their ri
- 1908473-018 : The threat of loss on conversion and the implicit dilution of existing stock holdings reduce shareholders' incentive to press management for higher risk in pursuit of higher returns.
- 1998455-010 : The threat of dilution of stock holdings, combined with the threat of loss on conversion, reduces the pressure shareholders place on the management of systemically important financial institutions to
- 1998455-032 : A contingent capital design that increases voting rights on conversion allows systemically important institutions to lower risk taking implicitly and to achieve an indirect, institution specific form
- 1998455-033 : Because the threat of a change of control leads leaders to take fewer risks in order to avoid triggering conversion, a contingent capital design with increased voting rights allows those leaders to ac
- 2097160-011 : A contingent capital award to executives without a conversion feature yields only limited governance improvement and only limited incentive to lower risk-taking; in its current form it operates as a m
- 2097160-015 : Regulatory triggers insufficiently incentivize executives to lower risk, because executives would not have to self-monitor and adjust their own risk-taking preferences in order to avoid the trigger.
- 2097160-019 : Because conversion damages both the debt portion and the surviving equity portion of an executive's package at the moment equity matters most for total pay, the combined effect is a strong incentive f
- 2097160-035 : Before conversion, contingent convertible bonds incentivize executives to lower risk-taking because their prices are sensitive to the downside risks of SIFIs, including default risk.
- 2097160-036 : Against the critique that long-term debt in pay does not deter short-run risky bets because expected short-term gains exceed the discounted value of the debt, adding early-trigger contingent convertib
- 2097160-040 : An early trigger design for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation enables earlier signaling of default risk, increases incentives for creditors and shareholders to monitor, and increa
- 2337268-001 : The Investment Advisers Act prohibits contingent fee arrangements between investment advisers and their clients because such arrangements could induce inappropriate risk taking by the adviser.
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-010 : Directors who are inadequately informed about the expected standard of conduct will underestimate their personal liability exposure and engage in riskier behavior than is desirable for the company its
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-018 : The different legal standards for allocating liability in Germany and the United States illustrate rather different legal and societal attitudes toward managers' risk-taking.
- kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-020 : If the liability standard were lowered, directors and officers would take their increased personal liability exposure into account and could be incentivized to engage in less risky behavior.
- 2470008-009 : The unprecedented growth of the private fund industry combined with the low interest rate environment created by post crisis quantitative easing drove private fund managers to reach for yield.
- 2715083-038 : Rising demand for alternative strategies creates incentives for mutual fund managers to find ways to simulate leverage, in an industry that historically used little leverage and presented little risk.
- 2748096-017 : The performance pressure on hedge fund managers incentivizes them to take disproportionately high risks in order to deliver sufficient client returns, and those disproportionate risks translate into p
- 2816408-007 : A second channel by which Title IV could lower performance is risk reduction: private fund advisers have expressed concern that regulation will force them to take on less risk and therefore earn lower
- 2957645-022 : The threat of dilution of stock holdings, combined with the threat of loss upon conversion, could help reduce the pressure shareholders place on management of systemically important financial institut
- 3995709-032 : Lower cost early feedback from the CRDAO enables risk taking by development teams that wish to move quickly through governance and upgrade processes, which in turn enables accelerated growth and scali
- 4734750-028 : Fast community feedback enables development teams to take risks and move quickly through their governance and upgrade processes, which in turn accelerates growth and the scaling of experimentation.