failure family

sybil and identity attack

29 claims across 16 works.

• Identity verification tradeoff: Centralized platforms cannot simply drop identity verification, because they need it to keep malicious actors from abusing the network and to ensure w
• Anonymity driven attack surface: Anonymity in blockchain organizations makes them prone to Sybil attacks and 51 percent attacks, and anonymity combined with autonomy has led to many h
• missing authentication of machine trust: The trust humans place in machines on the internet has never been verified, because neither centralized nor decentralized authentication engines have
• sybil attack on centralized reputation: Every centralized reputation score can be sybil attacked, because fake internet accounts or fictitious ratings disrupt true reputation scoring.
• sockpuppet self dealing in web of trust: A Web of Trust reputation system can be gamed with sockpuppet accounts, because an attacker can behave well for a while and then transact with himself
• identity verification does not deter valuable sockpuppets: Identity verification does not fix the sockpuppet problem, because whenever the reputation is genuinely valuable a sockpuppet operator can afford to c
• sockpuppets outpace honest validation: Sockpuppet accounts grow their reputation value much faster than honest users can in a Web of Trust, because sockpuppets validate each other, and the
• chain-cloning-indistinguishability: A malicious party using Sybil accounts cannot be prevented from cloning the structure of a successful proof of stake blockchain at far lower cost than
• Anonymity-enabled attacks: Anonymity in blockchain organizations makes them prone to Sybil attacks and 51 percent attacks, and anonymity combined with autonomy has already produ
• sockpuppet-attack: A DAO permitting anonymous membership is exposed to a sockpuppet attack in which one account behaves honestly while another cheats, and if the cheatin
• sockpuppet abuse of equal distribution: Equal distribution of output, where every member receives an equal share regardless of contribution, is impossible to maintain under current technolog
• multi node reward farming: Uptime based reward policies invite Sybil style abuse: on the original Casper testnet single persons ran fifteen or more validator nodes to exploit cl
• Anonymity dilution at scale: As a network grows its members become more anonymous and individually less important, which makes cheating more locally enticing and less globally not
• Sockpuppet attack: A Web of Trust style reputation ledger, in which each party rates each transaction and reputation is summed with weightings by rater reputation, will
• Fee and KYC pseudo-defense: Charging transaction fees or imposing KYC identity protocols does not solve the sockpuppet problem: such defenses push the cost of defending the netwo
• Equal salary sockpuppet exploit: Distributing salary equitably, for example equally to all members, is self-defeating: the obvious gaming strategy becomes creating multiple accounts a
• Inevitable sockpuppet exposure: Sockpuppet attacks are inevitable in any organization that wants open membership and anonymous members, and since those properties are essential to th
• Sockpuppet attack on Web of Trust: Every single reputational implementation the authors have audited in the blockchain DAO space carries the flaw of vulnerability to the sockpuppet atta
• Anonymous trolling friction: Anonymous decentralized networks can encourage troll behavior because participants feel safe attacking others without retribution, and in a DAO that t
• Sockpuppet attack on web-of-trust vouching: Proof of personhood projects such as Proof of Humanity and UBI DAO fail because they rest on web-of-trust theory, which has been proven not to work lo
• majority-conformity-reputation-gaming: A reputation system that rewards voting with the majority, as Bridge Mutual uses, can be manipulated by users who create multiple wallets and always v
• behavioral-mimicry-sybil-amplification: Sybil attack risk is amplified in reputation-driven systems relative to stake-based ones, because influence derives from behavioral metrics that an at
• Anonymity driven opportunism raises transaction costs: Automating smart contracts under the code is law paradigm incentivizes unethical behavior by enabling anonymous, opportunistic action, which reduces r
• identity-whitewashing: Reputation systems that depend on persistent identity collapse in decentralized settings because agents can create new identities at no cost, so a poo
• Sybil Resistance Mechanism Unspecified: Sybil resistance is only a design objective because the detector, dispersion statistic, threshold, error model, reputation update, Round 2 update, and
• Nontransferability Alone Does Not Resist Sybils: Non-transferability alone does not establish Sybil resistance.
• Adaptive Sybil Dispersion Camouflage: An adaptive adversary could disguise Round 1 coordination by injecting noise and coordinate only in Round 2, and the present mechanism does not preven
• Simulated Sybil Tolerance Is Not Established Resistance: Mode B remains above 0.90 simulated accuracy up to a 0.49 Sybil share, but unspecified detector and update components prevent this result from establi
• Authenticated But Unauthorized After False Continuity: Continuity determinations can fail in a specific and dangerous way: a false finding of continuity can authorize a different configuration to use the r