kaal:claim:3125827-040

A malicious party using Sybil accounts cannot be prevented from cloning the structure of a successful proof of stake blockchain at far lower cost than cloning a proof of work chain, leaving a new user unable to distinguish the truly decentralized chain from a clone that has manufactured even more tokens. The authors answer that this is resolved off chain, by a trusted user interface, as with cloned web pages.

Source quote, verbatim

Then, when a new user joins the network, how will they be able to distinguish a truly decentralized blockchain from a cloned blockchain that has manufactured an even larger number of tokens?

From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018), 6 Analysis, p. 28
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

Holds when

new users joining without prior knowledge of the genuine chain
PoS chains where clone creation costs only new public keys

Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: chain-cloning-indistinguishabilityfamily: sybil-and-identity-attackblockchainconsensus-and-securityreputation

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