Extension: Blockchain Technologies: Probability of Double-Spend Attack on a Proof-of-Stake Consensus
Record: kaal:position:2026-08-08-371 · 2026-08-08
Blockchain Technologies: Probability of Double-Spend Attack on a Proof-of-Stake Consensus quantifies two attack strategies. Their success probabilities depend on network parameters and confirmation depth. The authors use those results to derive the number of confirmations a vendor should await before delivering goods or services. These findings extend Kaal's claim that fixed consensus rules cannot eliminate strategic attacks by independent nodes. Transaction finality and confirmation depth bound, but do not remove, proof-of-stake double-spend risk. Only the Crossref-indexed abstract passed because the publisher PDF returned HTTP 403. No inference reaches every proof-of-stake protocol.
Affirmed commentary position. This record extends a source-bound scholarly claim but is not a verbatim paper claim.
Holds when
Current debate
Blockchain Technologies: Probability of Double-Spend Attack on a Proof-of-Stake Consensus
Scholarly basis
kaal:claim:3125827-001
Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827
Source PDF sha256: 598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb
Evidence and mapping
Evidence: Current Crossref record with immutable review receipt
Review tier: independent substantive general-literature extension
Mapping confidence: 0.62
Mapping ambiguous: false
Topics
consensus-and-securityregulatory-failureblockchaingovernance-designscholarly-literaturecrossrefevidence-provenance
Provenance
Affirmed in kaal-review:2026-08-08:continuous-crossref-0036-all-0106-reviewed-v1 on 2026-08-08. Review record.
Verify
Canonical markdown sha256: 1b6993119a01208cd52ebf51931816b6e4ee72c860aa3863f76ac678971b515d
curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/positions/2026-08-08-371.md | sha256sum