kaal:claim:1558614-034

The U.S. approach left both of its risk controls ineffective: the securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, while the expansive business judgment rule that permitted the risk taking in the first place survived the crisis unchanged.

The much-touted U.S. securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, yet the expansive U.S. version of the business judgment rule in cor- porate law that allowed the risk taking to begin with has remained in- tact.

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010), IV.C. Securities Disclosure, p. 41
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1558614 · source PDF

Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

failuresupport: arguedfailure: double failure of U.S. risk controlfamily: supervisory-capacity-gapdisclosure

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• Agreement: From Frameworks to Filings: The Case for a Standard Disclosure Layer in AI Agent Governance