failure family

supervisory capacity gap

39 claims across 22 works.

• interpreter-mediated-adjudication: Conducting judicial proceedings through interpreters is cumbersome and confusing and creates a perceived bias in favor of litigants and lawyers fluent
• judicial-learning-deficit: Because the judiciary in many European jurisdictions is a specialized career entered shortly after university and without significant private practice
• expertise-defeated-by-language: Expert judges in national courts who cannot understand the arguments of lawyers before them or read documents written in another language may not be e
• regulator-staffing-gap: Mandatory risk disclosure to the SEC would probably fail on staffing grounds, because professionals capable of understanding hedge fund risk data woul
• double failure of U.S. risk control: The U.S. approach left both of its risk controls ineffective: the securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, while the
• No going-concern reorganization path for German banks: Before the 2010 reform, the German regulatory intervention regime for financial institutions contained no procedure that would have reliably permitted
• Shareholder valuation proceedings slow bank reorganization: The German provision allowing appropriate compensation of shareholders whose rights are impaired can defeat the statute's own purpose, because time is
• Recovery-plan deadline unusable under time pressure: The supervisor's discretion to set a deadline for a recovery plan before issuing a transfer order is unlikely ever to be exercised in practice, becaus
• Undersized and slow-to-mobilize resolution fund: The German reorganization fund's maximum volume of 70 billion euros may not suffice in a financial crisis, and the availability of those funds and the
• kapmug-administrative-burden: The German KapMuG does not relieve trial judges of deciding the legal issues in every individual case, so it remains administratively burdensome even
• limited-judicial-capacity: U.S. courts have only a limited capacity to integrate parties' choice of law into a post-Morrison regime for defining transaction location, and adding
• centralized information reliance: Financial rulemaking often relies on centralized rather than decentralized information, which is a further defect of the existing framework.
• prosecutorial expertise gap: Prosecutors negotiating deferred prosecution agreements may lack the expertise needed to negotiate high level corporate governance changes such as per
• evaluative capacity gap for systemic risk data: Bankruptcy judges and the parties to a bankruptcy case may be unable to adequately evaluate Form PF data pertaining to a creditor, which limits the us
• misdirected regulatory focus: Pre-crisis regulatory attention was misallocated: although Bernanke identified failure to manage counterparty risk as the primary cause for concern, t
• Political complexity paralysis: The political system is less likely to be able to resolve the challenges of disruptive innovation because the increasing complexity of innovation-driv
• False positive regulatory resource waste: Even if regulators could obtain the depth of information needed for anticipatory rulemaking, acting on venture capital signals risks wasting scarce re
• Absent institutional capacity for data-driven anticipation: No regulatory processes or data evaluation capabilities currently exist that could carry out the cross-validated analyses and support the anticipatory
• Political confusion under complexity: The rising complexity of innovation driven regulatory issues confuses political and policy makers about rapidly emerging disruptive change, which make
• arbiter-expertise-deficit: Without judge expertise in the subject matter of a smart contract dispute, user confidence in effective and fair conflict resolution is undermined, wh
• Underfunded supervision leaves a monitoring void: Regulators are often unable to supervise financial institutions effectively because of insufficient public funding, and contingent capital securities
• advice-beyond-lawyer-competence: Exponentially increasing disruptive innovation will lead clients to routinely bring legal professionals problems that those lawyers cannot fully under
• regulator over-reaction from unsophistication: Regulators' relative unsophistication about the technology is itself a risk driver, because a poorly informed regulator is likely to over-react and pr
• regulatory resource shortfall: Neither national nor international regulators have the resources to fully investigate or regulate hedge fund activity, and the industry actively lobbi
• prudential model underspecification: There is currently no precise formula for devising effective integrated prudential hedge fund regulation, so the prudential model remains underspecifi
• structural opacity constraint: The complex trading, investing and corporate structures of active international hedge funds are a major constraint on effective prudential supervision
• unreliable counterparty risk assessment: Indirect regulation asks banks to fully assess the risk they incur from hedge fund counterparties, but that assessment is often dubious at best becaus
• creditor competition erosion: Competition among creditor banks undermines indirect regulation, because competing banks compromise on important elements of the risk management proce
• declining reserve audit coverage: Externally led auditing of digital asset reserves among custodial service providers is declining, falling 24 percentage points relative to the 2018 sa
• reviewer overload from long queues: Code review effectiveness is undermined by heavier review loads, because reviewers with longer review queues become overwhelmed and are more likely to
• Under-resourced charity regulator: The default regulatory remedy is impaired at the source: the IRS division charged with monitoring charities remains understaffed and underfinanced and
• Constrained information sharing between regulators: Information sharing remedies are self limiting: the Pension Protection Act of 2006 let the IRS share more charity tax record information with state of
• regulator expertise gap: The gap between regulators' technical understanding and the state of the art in AI drives rules to one of two failure states: too vague to be enforcea
• policy-implementation-gap: Quantum based policies and regulations stall at implementation because the complexity and counterintuitive character of quantum concepts make them har
• sunset-review-burden: Sunset regulation has fallen out of wide use, and the author attributes this primarily to the administrative burden and political inertia of regularly
• review-cost-deterrence: The cost of comprehensive legal review deters governments from committing the necessary resources, which prevents legal garbage collection from being
• centralized-supervision-deficiency: Traditional centralized AI driven supervision of AI agent transactions is deficient because it delivers only limited transparency, is susceptible to b
• distributed-oversight-opacity: The decentralized architecture of blockchain itself complicates accountability by rendering oversight across distributed networks opaque, and that opa
• compliance-analytics-scale-gap: Reliance on compliance analytics providers overlooks their scalability limits in monitoring vast decentralized transaction volumes and their inability