kaal:claim:1908473-006

The second trigger, which increases voting rights before resolution, should fire on evidence that conversion into equity was unsuccessful, that conversion came too early or too late, or that the firm's financial performance keeps trending downward.

Increasing the voting rights pre-resolution could be triggered by evidence that the conversion into equity was not successful, that conversion was triggered too early or too late, or that there is an overall continuing downward trend in the financial performance of the company.

Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011), I. INTRODUCTION, p. 12
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

• Applies after the first trigger has already converted debt into equity
• Applies before authorities initiate resolution

designsupport: arguedcontingent-capitalgovernance-designsystemic-risk

• extended_by kaal:claim:2061166-034 A second, sequential trigger placed before reorganization or resolution cushions the risk that policy makers m...
• extended_by kaal:claim:1998455-032 A contingent capital design that increases voting rights on conversion allows systemically important instituti...

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