kaal:claim:1998455-004

Because both European regulatory initiatives and the United States academic debate concentrate on the technical design features of contingent capital securities, the possible corporate governance applications of those securities are mostly ignored.

Source quote, verbatim

Regulatory initiatives in Europe and the academic debate in the United States focus on improving the technical design fea- tures of contingent capital securities. Given the importance of technical design features, possible applications of CCS for corpo- rate governance are mostly ignored.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), I. Introduction, p. 9
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

Holds when

state of the debate as of 2012 in Europe and the United States

Classification

empiricalsupport: assertedcontingent-capitalgovernance-designcorporate-governancedynamic-regulation

Related claims

extended_by kaal:claim:2273857-058 Managers are incentivized to manage their institutions so as to avoid contingent capital triggers, and that in...

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