kaal:claim:2273857-058

Managers are incentivized to manage their institutions so as to avoid contingent capital triggers, and that incentive itself can optimize the governance of financial institutions.

Managers are incentivized to manage their respective entities to avoid CoCo triggers, which can help optimize governance of financial institutions.

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013), IV. Implementation, p. 28
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

• CoCos are outstanding with credible trigger terms

mechanismsupport: arguedcontingent-capitalrisk-and-incentivesgovernance-designcorporate-governancedynamic-regulation

• extends kaal:claim:1998455-004 Because both European regulatory initiatives and the United States academic debate concentrate on the technica...
• extends kaal:claim:1998455-040 Contingent capital can facilitate an incentive structure that lets regulators rely partially on private party ...

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