kaal:claim:1998455-040

Contingent capital can facilitate an incentive structure that lets regulators rely partially on private party contracting for the design of these securities while still accounting for systemic risk.

Source quote, verbatim

Contingent capital could help fa- cilitate an incentive structure that allows regulators to rely par- tially on private party contracting for the design of CCS to ac- count for systemic risk.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012), VIII. Conclusion, p. 50
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

Holds when

where a general regulatory framework enables rather than displaces private ordering

Classification

designsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesdynamic-regulationsystemic-riskcontingent-capital

Related claims

extended_by kaal:claim:2273857-058 Managers are incentivized to manage their institutions so as to avoid contingent capital triggers, and that in...

Verify

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/267a5cf52ed1359c...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-040.md | sha256sum