kaal:claim:2029983-014

Government enforcement acts as a backstop that makes the case for choice of law freedom stronger: allowing parties to choose their legal regime is more defensible when bad choices, such as moving transactions to regimes with little regulation, do not thwart government enforcement.

Source quote, verbatim

The ar- gument for allowing choice of law freedom for transacting par- ties is more persuasive when bad choices by contracting par- ties—such as moving securities transactions offshore to regimes with little or no regulation—do not thwart enforcement action by government authorities.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012), I.C. Bifurcated Jurisdictional Competition in Securities Law, p. 22
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

Holds when

SEC and DOJ retain extraterritorial enforcement power under Section 929P

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedlaw-and-legal-systemscompliance

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