kaal:claim:2267560-038

During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, temporarily overcoming the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.

During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups so as to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process (Ostrom 1990).

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

• during and after crises

mechanismsupport: evidencedinnovationinstitutional-designdynamic-regulation

• restated_by kaal:claim:2273857-022 During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinter...

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