kaal:claim:2267560-039

The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking are likely to persist, which makes alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking more relevant.

Source quote, verbatim

The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking (Coffee 2012) are likely to persist, making alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking even more relevant.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

Classification

predictivesupport: argueddynamic-regulationinstitutional-design

Related claims

extended_by kaal:claim:2808132-028 The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial-and-error rulemaking, and the problems of r...

Verify

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/bc3e34c18552a96c...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-039.md | sha256sum