kaal:claim:2273857-019

The bounded rationality of public rulemakers aggravates shock conditions during rulemaking, because rulemakers satisfy their own constituencies rather than all affected parties and are therefore more willing to act on incomplete information.

The bounded rationality of public rulemakers—who are satisfying their respective constituencies rather than all affected parties and, therefore, may be more willing to act in an environment of incomplete information—can aggravate shock conditions during the rulemaking process.

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013), II. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

• public rulemakers accountable to particular constituencies

mechanismsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesdynamic-regulation

• extends kaal:claim:2267560-005 Rulemaking conducted under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality produces suboptimal ou...
• restated_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-010 In the current model of stable rulemaking, path dependencies lead rulemakers to act on a boundedly rational as...

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