kaal:claim:2486570-016

The less prevalent categories of governance change mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements are increased monitoring at 46 percent of the sample, board changes at 38 percent, business changes at 30 percent, and senior management changes at 30 percent.

include increased monitoring re- quirements (46 percent of the sample), N/DPA mandated board changes (38 per- cent of the sample), business changes (30 percent of the sample), and changes in senior management (30 percent of the sample).

Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014), VI.A. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS, p. 52
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

• sample of 271 publicly available N/DPAs, 1993 to 2013

empiricalsupport: evidencedcorporate-governancecomplianceempirical-evidence

• extended_by kaal:claim:kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-024 Over 97 percent of the non and deferred prosecution agreements executed in the United States between 1993 and ...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is 8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/03f48f2c716535ea...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-016.md | sha256sum

• Qualification: LEVERAGE EFFECT IN GOVERNANCE: BLOCKCHAIN GOVERNANCE