kaal:claim:2957645-019

Regulators are often unable to supervise financial institutions effectively because of insufficient public funding, and contingent capital securities could help fill the void that this supervisory incapacity leaves.

Source quote, verbatim

Given this potential, CCSs could help fill a void left by regulators' inability to supervise financial institutions effectively, often the result of insufficient public funding.

From

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017), III. Contingent Capital, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957645 · source PDF

Cite as

Kaal, Dynamic Regulation via Contingent Capital (2017). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2957645

Holds when

supervisory agencies operating under funding constraints

Classification

failuresupport: assertedfailure: Underfunded supervision leaves a monitoring voidfamily: supervisory-capacity-gapcontingent-capitalsystemic-risk

Related claims

restates kaal:claim:1998455-005 Combined with other corporate governance mechanisms, contingent capital securities function as an internal, in...

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