kaal:claim:3128900-026

Reputation scores clear the market on both sides: a low requester score makes workers less likely to accept that requester's offers, and a low worker score reduces the worker's likelihood of retention.

If requesters have a lower reputation score, workers become less likely to accept requesters' offers. In turn, low reputation scores for micro task workers result in a lower likelihood of retention for micro task work on the Semada Network.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018), 3.3 Reputation Score, p. 13
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900

• two sided reputation scoring visible to both parties

mechanismsupport: arguedreputationeconomicsrisk-and-incentives

• restated_by kaal:claim:4734750-037 Two sided reputation scores discipline both sides of the micro task market: workers become less likely to acce...
• generalizes kaal:claim:4755632-036 Reputation scores on the ALE Platform balance supply and demand through a two-sided incentive: requesters with...

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