kaal:claim:3406323-040

For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes there is a way to subvert the rules for individual profit at the expense of the group, a result the author attributes to the Folk Theorems of game theory.

Source quote, verbatim
For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.
From

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019), VII. Ethical Governance, p. 19
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323

Holds when
Classification

failuresupport: arguedfailure: static-rule-subversionfamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationeconomicsconsensus-and-securityreputationgovernance-design

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