For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes there is a way to subvert the rules for individual profit at the expense of the group, a result the author attributes to the Folk Theorems of game theory.
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For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.
extended_bykaal:claim:3411897-040 For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes, there is a way to subvert ...
extendskaal:claim:3402701-011 The Folk Theorems of game theory imply that no matter how complicated a stable coin protocol becomes, a powerf...
extended_bykaal:claim:3782193-011 No set of written rules can be made complete: the Folk Theorems demonstrate that however rules are written, st...
restated_bykaal:claim:3782192-017 The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that any rules that can be formally set down can be subverted: strategi...
restateskaal:claim:3402701-036 The Folk Theorems of game theory prove that no protocol, however complex or well engineered, can eliminate cor...
extended_bykaal:claim:3782220-004 Transcendental values are necessary for long-term stability because every formal, explicitly specified protoco...
supportskaal:claim:3402701-007 Good governance principles are crucial to every aspect of a long-term stable currency because markets inevitab...
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