kaal:claim:3411897-040

For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes, there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group, which is why static decentralized governance rules can always be gamed and only dynamic, changing rules can address the problem.

For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019), Part 3: The Future, Responsible Decentralization, p. 45
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897

• infinitely repeated games with reputation or stake based rules
• static rule sets

failuresupport: arguedfailure: static-rules-are-gameablefamily: rule-obsolescence-and-ossificationeconomicsgovernance-designconsensus-and-securityrisk-and-incentives

• extends kaal:claim:3406323-040 For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes there is a way to subvert t...
• extends kaal:claim:3406323-041 A dynamic, changing set of governance rules can address the problem that any static rule set is gameable, and ...
• restated_by kaal:claim:3782203-005 No static set of rules can perfectly reflect the will of a group without leaving loopholes that adversaries ex...

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