kaal:claim:3441904-021

A one token one vote mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on chain governance resembles a plutocracy, because holders of a significant share of total token supply hold more power than the rest of the members.

Source quote, verbatim

A one-token-one-vote voting mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on-chain governance resembles a plutocracy.

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019), III.4 Lacking On-Chain Voting Mechanism, p. 19
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

Holds when

decentralized protocols with on chain governance as of the end of 2019

Classification

failuresupport: evidencedfailure: token-weighted-plutocracyfamily: incumbent-resistance-to-adoptiontokenomicsgovernance-design

Related claims

restated_by kaal:claim:3799320-027 Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which a...
extended_by kaal:claim:3808873-039 One token one vote on chain governance produces plutocracy: it allocates more power to holders of a significan...
restated_by kaal:claim:3652481-030 The one token one vote designs popular in the early 2020s produced suboptimal voting outcomes because they all...

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Positions extending this scholarly claim

Qualification: Research on the Dynamic Governance Mechanism of Supply Chain Information System Based on Differential Game