kaal:claim:3652481-030

The one token one vote designs popular in the early 2020s produced suboptimal voting outcomes because they allocate more power to holders of a large share of total token supply, leaving majority holders more powerful than all remaining holders combined.

Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one- token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020), IV.1.b On-Chain Governance, p. 38
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

• one token one vote voting mechanisms

failuresupport: arguedfailure: token plutocracyfamily: short-termismtokenomicsgovernance-design

• restated_by kaal:claim:3799320-027 Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which a...
• restated_by kaal:claim:3808873-039 One token one vote on chain governance produces plutocracy: it allocates more power to holders of a significan...
• restates kaal:claim:3441904-021 A one token one vote mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on chain governance resembles a plutoc...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3981021-028 Reputation staking overcomes the polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes produced by one token one vot...

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