kaal:claim:3799320-027

Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which allocate more power to holders of a significant share of total token supply.

Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then-popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one-token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021), Governance, p. 18
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

• one token one vote governance designs

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: Token plutocracyfamily: plutocratic-capturetokenomicsgovernance-design

• restates kaal:claim:3652481-030 The one token one vote designs popular in the early 2020s produced suboptimal voting outcomes because they all...
• restates kaal:claim:3441904-021 A one token one vote mechanism in existing decentralized protocols with on chain governance resembles a plutoc...
• restated_by kaal:claim:3808873-039 One token one vote on chain governance produces plutocracy: it allocates more power to holders of a significan...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3981021-028 Reputation staking overcomes the polarizing effects and suboptimal vote outcomes produced by one token one vot...

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