kaal:claim:3782203-010

Because a group sometimes genuinely has no consensus to be discovered, network forking is at times inevitable rather than a governance failure that better rules could prevent.

Source quote, verbatim

First, that is a major problem for democracy. Sometimes there is no consensus to be had. This leads to the second conclusion that sometimes network forking is inevitable.

From

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021), Application to network forking, p. 6
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203 · source PDF

Cite as

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

Holds when

cyclic or irreconcilable group preferences
decentralized networks whose members can exit

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedfailure: inevitable-forkfamily: collective-action-and-coordination-failureconsensus-and-securityblockchaingovernance-design

Related claims

supports kaal:claim:3441904-005 Forking a chain is an insufficient governance mechanism, and even attempts to create socially optimal chain fo...

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