kaal:claim:3782214-037

Without the ability to hold representatives to account, representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes reflecting their constituency's wishes and needs, but instead promote agendas that serve their personal interests and preserve their own power.

Without the ability to hold them to account, representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes that reflect the presumptive wishes and needs of their larger constituency, but for promoting the agendas which benefit their per- sonal interests and maintaining their own power.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021), Microdemocracy, p. 28
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214 · source PDF

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214

• modern societies where voters do not know their representatives personally

failuresupport: arguedfailure: unaccountable delegationfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismgovernance-design

• restated_by kaal:claim:3808867-013 Elected representatives are incentivized to maintain their own power of office rather than to vote for outcome...

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