kaal:claim:3808867-013

Elected representatives are incentivized to maintain their own power of office rather than to vote for outcomes reflecting the presumptive wishes and needs of their constituents.

Voted representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes that reflect the presumptive wishes and needs of their constituents but for maintaining their own power of office.

Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021), III. Technological Microdemocracy, p. 8
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, How Decentralized Systems Can Upgrade AI (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808867

• representative democracies

failuresupport: assertedfailure: Representative incentive misalignmentfamily: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunismrisk-and-incentivesai-and-agentscorporate-governancegovernance-design

• restates kaal:claim:3782214-037 Without the ability to hold representatives to account, representatives are not incentivized to vote for outco...

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