kaal:claim:3799320-013

Effective institutional governance requires a duality of incentives, namely incentives for actors to improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the long run, in order to defeat rational and opportunistic attempts to game the design.

Human nature and any effective machine derivatives of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO.

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021), Suboptimal Incentive Design, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

• institutions with rational, opportunistic internal and external constituents

conditionsupport: arguedrisk-and-incentivesregulatory-failureinstitutional-design

• extends kaal:claim:3652481-019 Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governanc...
• restated_by kaal:claim:3808873-037 Effective institutional governance, human or machine, requires a duality of incentives in which actors improve...
• restates kaal:claim:3441904-018 Participants must be incentivized to improve their own utility while simultaneously benefiting the institution...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/51bf96ab071df1f2...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-013.md | sha256sum