kaal:claim:3799320-015

The identity of actors in a DAO governance design is itself a source of corruption, so merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.

Similarly, the identity of actors in a DAO governance design creates typically corruptive elements. Merit identifiers other than individual identity remove the most corruptive influences.

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021), Suboptimal Incentive Design, p. 11
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

• governance designs that expose actor identity

mechanismsupport: arguedgovernance-design

• restates kaal:claim:3652481-021 The identity of actors in a DAO governance design typically creates corruptive elements, and merit identifiers...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3808873-038 When fungible assets are the dominant incentive design in the governance of DAOs with identifiable actors, rat...
• extends kaal:claim:3441904-019 Corruption is possible whenever actors in a governance design can be identified, and every historical instanti...

The quote above is an exact substring of the source PDF, whose sha256 is c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63. Extraction method: pdf-text-layer.
Attestation record: colloquium/attestations/98d8114bdc0efe3e...json
Verify the binding yourself: curl -s https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-015.md | sha256sum