kaal:claim:3799320-029

Reputation voting has two advantages over one token one vote: it is non fungible, which avoids corruptive elements, and it aligns incentives for members individually and for the institution as a whole at the same time.

1) it is non-fungible which avoids corruptive elements, and 2) it optimally aligns incentives for DAO of DAOs members individually and at the same time aligns their incentives for the totality of the DAO of DAOs as an institution.

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021), Reputation-Based Internal Governance, p. 19
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

• DAO of DAOs internal governance

designsupport: arguedreputationgovernance-designai-and-agentsrisk-and-incentivesdao

• generalizes kaal:claim:4685567-025 Weighted reputation voting has key advantages over WEB2 and WEB3 one token one vote mechanisms because it alig...
• restates kaal:claim:3441904-038 Optimized DAO governance should pay members only indirectly, through fungible salary tokens issued in proporti...
• extended_by kaal:claim:3981021-029 Reputation staking avoids the corruptive effects of fungible token staking because non fungible reputation has...
• generalizes kaal:claim:3962614-038 In the non custodial DAO investment club model all of the return on purchase is minted into fungible reputatio...

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