kaal:claim:3808873-037

Effective institutional governance, human or machine, requires a duality of incentives in which actors improve their own utility while their actions benefit the whole institution over the long run, and without that duality rational and opportunistic constituents will game the governance design.

Human nature and any effective machine derivates of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO.

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021), XI. Lack of Decentralized Governance Systems, p. 30
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization Neutralizers (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3808873

• DAO governance designs facing internal and external opportunistic actors

conditionsupport: arguedfailure: Incentive Duality Failurefamily: staking-and-incentive-misalignmentrisk-and-incentivesdaogovernance-design

• extends kaal:claim:3652481-019 Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governanc...
• restates kaal:claim:3799320-013 Effective institutional governance requires a duality of incentives, namely incentives for actors to improve t...
• restates kaal:claim:3441904-018 Participants must be incentivized to improve their own utility while simultaneously benefiting the institution...

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