kaal:claim:3949098-034

Conflicts of interest from DAOIC members participating on the public side of a deal are minimized because the loosely coupled reputation staking vote and its transition to a tightly coupled vote are transparent to the public.

However, such practices are rather limited because of the transparent nature of the loosely coupled RNFT voting on a particular deal and the transition to tightly coupled voting.

Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021), IV. Policy Considerations, 1. Standard Setting, p. 28
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098 · source PDF

Wulf A. Kaal, Reputation as Capital – How DAOs Upgrade Finance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3949098

• loosely coupled votes on particular deals are publicly visible

mechanismsupport: argueddisclosuregovernance-design

• extended_by kaal:claim:4067783-018 DAO governance should use a two vote model that distinguishes a loosely coupled vote, where no reputation is a...
• specializes kaal:claim:3782214-030 Loosely coupled voting, in which staked reputation cannot be lost, encourages dissenting opinions, while tight...

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