kaal:claim:4734750-037

Two sided reputation scores discipline both sides of the micro task market: workers become less likely to accept offers from low reputation requesters, and low reputation workers are less likely to be retained.

Source quote, verbatim

If requesters have a lower reputation score, workers become less likely to accept requesters

From

Wulf A. Kaal, Code Review DAO (2024), Removing Cost of Duplication, p. 29
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4734750 · source PDF

Cite as

Wulf A. Kaal, Code Review DAO (2024). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4734750

Classification

mechanismsupport: arguedreputationeconomics

Related claims

generalizes kaal:claim:4755632-036 Reputation scores on the ALE Platform balance supply and demand through a two-sided incentive: requesters with...
restates kaal:claim:3128900-026 Reputation scores clear the market on both sides: a low requester score makes workers less likely to accept th...

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