kaal:claim:kaal-2013-acomparativeperspectiveo-013

German commentators, whose expertise German courts rely on heavily, concluded after the financial crisis that managers do not act reasonably under the German business judgment rule if the risks they take on behalf of the corporation result in the demise of the corporation.

German commentators (contrary to their counterparts in the United States, German courts rely heavily on the expertise of commentators) concluded that managers do not act reasonably in terms of the German business judgment rule if risks

Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013), A Comparative Perspective on the Duty to Monitor, p. 6
· source PDF

Kaal, A Comparative Perspective on the Limitations of the Duty of Oversight – A Comment on Lisa Fairfax (2013)

• Germany
• post financial crisis evaluation of liability rules

empiricalsupport: evidencedsystemic-riskrisk-and-incentivescorporate-governancelaw-and-legal-systems

• restates kaal:claim:1558614-024 Under the German business judgment rule's benefit of the corporation element, management cannot be acting for ...
• specializes kaal:claim:1558614-006 Although the business judgment rule is articulated differently in the two countries and German law leaves some...
• extends kaal:claim:1558614-022 The German and U.S. business judgment rules diverge most sharply at the German rule's fifth element, the requi...
• restates kaal:claim:1558614-026 Under the German hazard decision doctrine, no manager acts reasonably, whether a bank officer or a board membe...

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